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Abstract
The aim of consensus is essential to deliberative democracy. However, this aim has also been fre-
quently criticized. In this article, I present two different forms of criticism against consensus in demo-
cratic education. The first, articulated by scholars of education for democracy, claims that the aim of 
consensus fails to account for the conflictual nature of democracy and thereby disallows disagree-
ment and dissensus. The second, formulated by classroom practitioners, argues that it disrupts the 
pattern of communication in classroom discussions. I nevertheless attempt to defend consensus on 
both accounts by arguing that it is a multifaceted concept that allows for different types of agreements 
and disagreements to coexist and therefore will stand in the way neither of pluralism nor of dissensus. 
It also will not necessarily foster undesirable patterns of communication in classroom discussions.
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The very definition of the word democracy is “government by the people.” In a democratic society, people with different preferences and different 
beliefs are expected to collectively make decisions regarding their 
shared society. Such decisions should, according to proponents of 
deliberative democracy, largely be based on public deliberation. By 
placing public deliberations at the heart of democracy, the political 
order can be justified, they argue. However, they also argue that the 
political order should be justified to everyone living under its laws 
(Chambers, 2003). Deliberative democracy is, therefore, often 
conceived of as operating with a consensus- driven form of democ-
racy. However, scholars who question the deliberative conception 
of democracy have frequently criticized this aspect.
Deliberative democracy has been widely discussed in political 
philosophy the last decades, to the point that some scholars even 
talk about a deliberative turn (Dryzek, 2002). Naturally, delibera-
tive democracy has also been more and more frequently suggested 
as the aim of democratic education. In a review of the field of 
education for deliberative democracy, Samuelsson and Bøyum 
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(2015) argued that there is an overarching pedagogical agreement 
in this field: Future citizens (should) learn the skills and values 
necessary for deliberative democratic participation by participat-
ing in deliberative democratic situations. By this line of reasoning, 
consensus becomes an integral part of both the educational 
practice and the educational aim. It becomes a part of the educa-
tional practice based on the logic that if future citizens are to 
practice at democratic deliberation in, for example, classroom 
discussions, consensus needs to be a part of those discussions 
(Englund, 2006; Samuelsson, 2016). It becomes a part of the 
educational aim in virtue of the fact that the ability to participate in 
discussions striving for consensus is seen as a necessary skill to 
master (Samuelsson, 2016). However, as deliberative democracy 
has been transferred to the educational context, the aspect of 
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consensus has again been criticized, this time by educational 
scholars. They argue that consensus dismisses all possibilities for 
pluralism and dissensus and is therefore an unfit ideal for demo-
cratic education. Furthermore, during fieldwork for a research 
project I conducted, I found that teachers with lengthy experience 
in leading classroom discussions were also very resistant to the 
idea of striving to achieve consensus in classroom discussions.
However, in this paper I defend consensus as an aim both in 
democratic education and in classroom discussions. My main 
argument is that consensus is both a regulative idea to guide us and 
a multifaceted concept that on its own does not dismiss all possi-
bilities for disagreement and, therefore, should not be considered 
problematic as an aim for democratic education or classroom 
discussions. Thus, even though consensus is derived from the 
deliberative conception and that aiming for it in democratic 
education might first and foremost serve a deliberative purpose, I 
argue that it nevertheless should be considered unproblematic to 
those favoring other conceptions of democracy as the aim of 
democratic education. Before mounting this defense, however, I 
give a brief presentation of deliberative democracy and its ideal of 
consensus, followed by an account of some of the scholarly 
criticism. Next, I provide a short description of the empirical study 
from which the pedagogical criticism is drawn and outline the 
main points of criticism. Finally, I formulate and present the 
defense for consensus, which I base on Dryzek and Niemeyer’s 
(2010) typology of consensus, and discuss how this nuanced 
formulation may be used to address some of the criticism it has 
been facing in democratic education.
Deliberative Democracy and Consensus
No conception of democracy has been more thoroughly discussed 
during the past three decades than deliberative democracy. 
Deliberative democracy, broadly defined, is any conception of 
democracy that places public deliberations at the core of democ-
racy (Bohman, 1998). A public deliberation is a process in which 
free and equal citizens give defensible reasons, explanations, and 
accounts for laws they wish to impose on their fellow citizens 
(Held, 2006). In this process, citizens and their representatives to 
the government are expected to argue for their own perspectives 
while at the same time carefully listening and responding to 
counterarguments made by others, regardless of who makes them 
(Fishkin, 2009). Thus, according to this view, the democratic 
process is, or at least should be, a process of social cooperation with 
the aim of communicatively reaching a collective decision about 
“what to do,” rather than a competitive process in which fixed 
preferences battle against each other (Chambers, 2003).
Theories of deliberative democracy have generally been 
critical of democracy as merely a practice of voting followed by 
majority rule. According to these theories, majority rule is 
insufficient when it comes to democratic legitimacy (Bohman, 
1998) because it enforces democratic decisions as the will of the 
“winners” rather than as the will of the people. Indeed, it is possible 
to argue that it actually coerces a portion of the population into 
submission rather than treating them as fellow citizens in a 
democracy. Therefore, theories of deliberative democracy argue 
that democratic decisions are legitimate if, and only if, they are the 
object of a free and reasoned agreement among equals (Cohen, 
1989, p. 22). However, a legitimate political order is not only one 
that is justified through a process of reason- giving but also one that 
is deemed justifiable by everyone living under its laws (Chambers, 
2003). Consensus is, therefore, embedded in this understanding of 
democracy as an underlying ideal, because, if every citizen should 
be able to accept the outcome of the decisions, and/or the reasons 
for them, the democratic process needs to aim toward some kind of 
understanding of consensus.
Early accounts of deliberative democracy contain the 
conviction that it is possible to achieve an actual consensus. 
Contemporary theories, however, have modified this ideal slightly, 
but most still hold that discussions should be oriented toward 
consensus even if it is not always obtainable (Dryzek & Niemeyer, 
2010). This redefines consensus as a regulative idea, an aim to strive 
for, rather than an endpoint always to be reached. By aiming 
toward consensual agreements, citizens and their representatives 
are encouraged to seek solutions across different belief systems 
(overlapping consensus) (Rawls, 1987), to use arguments other 
reasonable citizens can accept (reciprocity), and to use arguments 
accessible and applicable to everyone affected by the decision 
(Gutmann & Thompson, 2004). This will solve some moral 
disagreements simply by making people better informed. How-
ever, some moral disagreements are more persistent, as are, for 
example, moral disagreements over incompatible values, to which 
there are no simple rational superior facts or arguments available. 
In such cases, the deliberative process can result in a deadlock that 
would require a vote, or compromise, to break the tie (Habermas, 
1998; Gutmann & Thompson, 2004). Yet even in such cases, the 
process of deliberation is valuable because it helps clarify what  
the disagreement is about, helps citizens and representatives to 
understand the problem better, makes them acknowledge the 
moral position(s) of the opposition, and ultimately, increases  
the possibility that the final decision will be accepted. Further-
more, contemporary theories of deliberative democracy also 
emphasize that the decisions made are always temporary and that 
the issues are always open to further investigation (Gutmann & 
Thompson, 2004).
Despite the modification of consensus into a regulative idea, 
however, it is still one of the most frequently criticized aspects of 
deliberative democracy. The most insistent criticism comes from 
the perspective of radical pluralists, a notion favoring the confron-
tational nature of democracy (see, for example, Mouffe, 1996,  
1999, & 2000). According to this perspective, consensus is prob-
lematic because it conceals informal oppression and precludes any 
real opportunity for democratic disagreement. Furthermore, 
radical pluralists argue that deliberative democracy’s formulation 
of consensus often coincides with the interests of those in power 
and that if one continually strives for consensus, the views and 
interests of marginalized people will be excluded from democratic 
discourses (Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2010). Therefore, by placing 
consensus at the center of democracy, one leaves the most funda-
mental and essential aspects of democracy— disagreement and 
confrontation— out of the equation and deprives people of being 
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democratic subjects. Based on arguments such as these, critics 
argue that consensus, rather than being a desirable democratic 
characteristic, is a symptom of a dysfunctional society laden with 
social pressure, conformity and marginalization.
Education for Democracy and Consensus
We now turn to the field of education for democracy where there 
are several scholars arguing for deliberative democracy as the aim 
of democratic education and for the placement of reason- giving 
skills, listening skills, and values such as reciprocity at the center of 
such an education (Samuelsson & Bøyum, 2015). However, there 
are also critical voices questioning aspects of the deliberative 
conception. They often base their criticism on the radical, pluralis-
tic view, and they quite frequently question the aim of consensus. 
Thus, the same objection that is found in the field of political 
philosophy is also found in the field of education. One such 
example is Ruitenberg (2010):
Mouffe and Rancière agree that the currently dominant framework of 
deliberative democracy does not sufficiently recognize the constitutive 
nature of disagreement. The deliberative conception of democracy and 
democratic citizenship emphasizes rational deliberation leading to 
political consensus. For Moffue and Rancière, however . . . consensus 
means erasing the contestatory, conflictual nature of the very givens of 
common life. (p. 44)
Ruitenberg was skeptical of using deliberative democracy’s 
idea of consensus as an aim for democratic education on the basis 
that (rational) consensus diminishes any real possibility for 
disagreement. By focusing on consensus, the essential conflictual 
nature of democracy is erased, and she therefore argued that 
consensus is unfit as an aim of a democratic education. One finds a 
similar example of an argument against consensus in Biesta (2011):
The prime task of democratic politics is not to eliminate passion  
from the sphere of the public, in order to render a rational consensus 
possible, but to mobile those passions towards democratic designs . . . 
The democratic subject, so we might say, is the one who is driven by a 
desire for democracy or, to be more precise, a desire for engagement 
with the ongoing experiment of democratic existence. (p. 151)
In this article, Biesta (2011) was hesitant about the aim of 
consensus on the basis that it can disrupt other vital aspects  
of democracy such as passion and “a desire to engage with ongoing 
democratic processes” (p. 151). According to this argument, 
striving toward consensus can inhibit the democratic process (of 
disagreement) and thus should not be the aim of democratic 
education. Instead, Biesta presented an alternative aim for demo-
cratic education and a pedagogical practice to go with it:
The political subject is not so much the producer of consensus as that 
it is the “product” of dissensus. It is not, therefore, that education 
needs to make individuals ready for democratic politics; it is rather 
that through engagement in democratic politics political subjectivity is 
engendered. (p. 150)
Instead of teaching future citizens specific skill sets used to 
reach rational consensus, a democratic education should focus on 
fostering “the desire to engage in democratic politics” (Biesta, 2011, 
p. 150), by letting individuals participate in practices of disagree-
ment and dissensus.
These two articles are perhaps the most explicit examples of 
how critical scholars within the educational field argue in terms  
of deliberative democracy’s ideal of consensus (for other examples, 
see Griffin, 2012; Ruitenberg, 2009; Waghid, 2005). Their criticism 
is (often) rooted in the view of radical pluralism, and their argu-
ments are therefore the same as those found in the field of political 
philosophy; the only difference is that they are now used to argue 
against the aim of democratic education.
Classroom Discussions and Consensus
Having shown how scholars of education for democracy argue 
against consensus as the aim for democracy and democratic 
education, I now turn to teachers’ criticism against consensus as an 
aim of (democratic) classroom discussions.
Empirical study
During the spring and autumn of 2014, I collected data for a 
research project investigating “education for deliberative democ-
racy.” Proponents in the field of education for deliberative  
democracy commonly assume that the skills necessary for 
deliberative participation, such as the ability to make arguments 
and give reasons, to listen to others, and so on, while at the same 
time being part of a collective will formation, are (best) learned 
through participation in democratic deliberation (Samuelsson & 
Bøyum, 2015). According to this argument, through participating 
in democratic deliberation, people will have the opportunity to 
participate in democratic deliberation and thereby become 
gradually and increasingly competent at it. Consequently, a main 
point of interest in this project was to conduct in- depth investiga-
tions of classroom discussions.
I visited three different schools located on the west coast of 
Norway. I accompanied one teacher at each school for approxi-
mately two weeks, observed their classroom practices, conducted 
formal interviews, and was involved in informal conversations. In 
addition, I conducted one formal interview with a fourth teacher, 
but without observing his classroom practices. The four teachers 
all taught various subjects, and they were all located at schools with 
different profiles. Susan, a teacher for over fifteen years, was 
teaching psychology, English, and religion to upper secondary 
students at a parochial school with a moderate degree of ethnical 
diversity. Evelyn was teaching English, social science, and math to 
students in grade six to nine at a school with a large degree of 
ethnical diversity and was engaged in activities related to the 
student council. Margaret, in contrast to the other three teachers, 
was the head of her own class, a fifth- grade class, and thus con-
ducted all of her teaching in that class, involving numerous 
subjects such as math, English, Norwegian, religion, and social 
science. Finally, Patrick, whose classroom I did not visit, was 
teaching at several different schools, at various grade levels, and in 
various subjects. None of the teachers were familiar with delibera-
tive democracy prior to participating in this study. This came as no 
surprise since deliberative democracy as a concept is absent from 
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everyday conversations in Norway, as well as in newspaper articles 
and public politics. Furthermore, even though the Norwegian 
national curriculum includes democratic competence as an 
explicit aim, the deliberative conception is absent there as well 
(Samuelsson, 2013). The most important aspect in relation to this 
article, however, is that these teachers were all interested in 
democracy and education, and they were highly experienced in 
leading classroom discussions.
During the interviews, the central characteristics of demo-
cratic deliberations, and thus also for deliberative classroom 
discussions, were topics of conversation. The specific formulation 
used during the interviews was that of Englund (2006), which 
states that a deliberative (educative) discussion is one where  
(a) different views confront one another and arguments for them 
are articulated, (b) there is a tolerance and respect for the concrete 
other and participants listen to each other’s arguments, and, finally, 
(c) there are elements of collective will formation, a desire to reach 
consensus or at least a temporary agreement.1 The pedagogical 
assumption is that by participating in classroom discussions 
following these criteria, students will have the opportunity to 
practice making arguments, giving reasons, listening to others, and 
so on, while at the same time being part of a collective will forma-
tion process that strives toward agreement, and by this, gradually 
become more and more competent at democratic deliberation 
(Samuelsson, 2016, p. 3).2 Given the teachers’ experience, I was 
interested in listening to their thoughts of having classroom 
discussions structured around this ideal.
Pedagogical Criticism of Consensus
The four teachers were all positive to the idea of structuring 
classroom discussions around the deliberative ideals of (a) 
reason- giving (b) and reflection. However, they all expressed 
considerable resistance to the idea of having (c) classroom 
discussions aim at reaching consensus. In their opinion, aiming at 
consensus in classroom discussions was fraught with serious 
difficulties. Margaret said:
The teacher should not be evaluative. That is the hardest part, to 
actually hold back and to stop yourself from giving positive feedback 
when the students are saying something “really good.” You want to, to 
say, “Very good, that is interesting,” but you have to hold back and let 
the discussion flow among the students. That can be challenging, but  
if you want a safe classroom climate where the students really listen  
to each other, then aiming at consensus can be a tricky thing, it  
really can.
1  For a more thorough discussion concerning these criteria, see Samuels-
son (2016).
2  A common criticism of deliberative democracy is that public delibera-
tions often lead to extreme and polarized opinions (Sunstein, 2000). 
However, as argued in Samuelsson (2016), the fact that real- life 
deliberations are challenging only emphasizes the need for an educa-
tion for deliberative democracy. Furthermore, many argue that (public) 
schools are the ideal site for conducting such an education because, 
among other things, they contain a great diversity of opinions (Englund, 
2006; Hess, 2009).
Margaret presented an argument against consensus based on 
her experience that it can negatively affect the classroom climate. 
According to Margaret, striving for consensus would have to 
involve the evaluation of students’ opinions, which often creates an 
atmosphere in which students are afraid to express themselves. 
Furthermore, it also makes it more difficult to get them to listen to 
each other, and in the end, it may be difficult to establish a natural 
flow in the discussion.
Patrick argued against consensus on a similar ground: that it 
changes the pattern of communication in undesirable ways. 
However, he presented an alternative explanation for why. “If a 
classroom discussion aims at reaching consensus, students will be 
preoccupied with trying to get their way. If a classroom discussion 
is supposed to end with consensus, or come to a conclusion, it 
means that it can have winners.” In his experience, this fact makes 
students alter their approach and instead of listening and respond-
ing to each other, they end up trying to win an argument. The 
discursive pattern is thereby changed into a form of competition 
rather than one characterized by curiosity and respect.
Evelyn argued that having classroom discussions aim at 
consensus can force students into agreements:
(Interviewer) You said that everybody has to be able to have 
an own opinion (in a classroom discussion), but how does 
that relate to the aspect of trying to reach a collective will 
formation?
(Evelyn) That can be difficult . . . I do not want to force anyone 
in the classroom to agree that “this” is the only right 
thing . . . I think it is important that those who reserve the 
right to disagree should be given time and space to reflect 
on why they disagree but not be forced into making 
decisions then and there . . . I cannot really picture how 
those two are related because for me, in a classroom 
discussion, it is not a matter of life and death whether 
everybody agrees or not. I think agreement is difficult to 
achieve and striving for it only makes the discussion 
artificial.
According to Evelyn, consensual agreement is rare in class-
room discussions and because of this, having discussions end with 
consensus implies that some form of coercion has been used. She 
went on to explain why forcing students into agreements is 
problematic in classroom discussions:
I have students whose families are from countries where 
homosexuality has been banned. These students need to be allowed to 
have, and express, these opinions in a classroom in Norway. It is a big 
responsibility on my part that, as their teacher, even if I disagree with 
them, to provide them with the same opportunities for verbal 
expression as anybody else. I also have to make sure that they do not 
feel trampled on because of these opinions, because they are so young 
and they should not be burdened by the opinions they are carrying 
with them . . . I think that can be a pretty horrible thing in that age, to 
feel that others are laughing at you.
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Similar to Margaret, Evelyn argued that there is a problematic 
side to consensus, that striving for it has to involve challenging and 
valuing student opinions. She said this deprives some 
students— mainly those with unpopular opinions— of the oppor-
tunity to express themselves and that one needs to prioritize 
making students feel secure in classroom discussions. Further-
more, she explained that by challenging students and their 
opinions, and by forcing some of them to give theirs up in order to 
come to agreements, she would risk having students feel trampled 
on and would wind up placing them under emotional strain.
Susan, the teacher at a parochial school, contested the aim of 
consensus in a similar way:
(Susan) It is definitely within a framework of respect but there 
is not a will formation per se.
(Interviewer) Is it more an exploring of differences?
(Susan) It is an exploration, exactly, but never consensus, 
because I think that means to compromise and I am not 
going to compromise. I have spent a lot of time reading, 
being at school myself, thinking, and talking and I am not 
going to just throw that out to compromise. But I don’t 
expect them to compromise either, to give up something 
they hold dear just because it is against what the majority 
believes.
Susan expressed her skepticism toward the idea of having 
classroom discussions aim at consensus based on the view that 
consensus means to compromise. Compromising in classroom 
discussions is problematical, because in her view, it involves asking 
students to give up something they “hold dear.” She went on to 
explain the kind of negative consequences this might have:
(Susan) You know, here at a religious school, are you for or 
against abortion? We actually had a woman here from 
Oslo and she was talking from a Christian point of view 
about the protection of the unborn and the students were 
already confrontational after half an hour . . . None of 
them liked her, whether they were for or against. They 
thought she was close minded, that she was rude and so 
on . . . I realized that you have to back off and respect the 
students and that woman wasn’t doing that.
For example, if as a teacher she tried to convince her students 
to agree with her beliefs, she would likely provoke a confronta-
tional response. Subsequently, this could cause the students to lose 
respect for her. In her opinion, a teacher leading a classroom 
discussion should instead back off and respect the students and 
their opinions and not try to convince them to give those up.
The four teachers interviewed, all experienced in leading 
classroom discussions, presented pedagogical reasons for not 
aiming at consensus in classroom discussions. First, aiming at 
consensus can negatively affect the discussion itself. It can make it 
more difficult to get the students to express themselves, to get them 
to participate verbally, and to get them to really listen to each other. 
Thus, it can create undesirable patterns of communication. Second, 
aiming at consensus can also have undesired consequences beyond 
the context of a specific discussion, such as creating emotional 
strain in students, making them give up ideals, and making them 
lose some respect for the teacher.
Defending the Aim of Consensus
So far, I have presented two types of criticism against consensus in 
democratic education. The first, coming from scholars of educa-
tion for democracy, criticizes consensus as a democratic ideal  
and thus as an aim for democratic education as well, on the 
grounds that it fails to account for the conflictual nature of 
democracy and thereby disallows disagreements and dissensus. 
The second type, coming from classroom practitioners, criticizes 
consensus as a goal for classroom discussions because it alters the 
pattern of communication in undesirable ways and may have 
negative effects on the students. In this final section of the paper, I 
will articulate a defense of consensus on both accounts.
Scholars in education for democracy in their criticism of 
consensus ground their rationale in radical pluralism. They argue 
that by striving for consensus, one disallows disagreements, 
suppresses voices and opinions of marginalized people, and 
instead promotes the interests of those in power. Therefore, they 
argue that a democratic education should instead be based on the 
conflictual platform found in radical democracy and focus on 
teaching people how to live and cope with ongoing disagreements. 
By this shift in focus, they argue that their notion of democratic 
education better preserves the essential democratic aspects of 
pluralism, inclusion, and disagreement, and is thus more suitable 
as an aim for democratic education.
As an initial response to this criticism, one might posit that, 
based on the understanding that democracy is about making 
decisions together regarding a shared society, there has to be more 
to democracy than purely disagreement, confrontation, and 
disruption. Therefore, to focus solely on variants of dissent makes 
little sense (Dryzek & Niemeyer 2010, p. 93). Secondly, as Dryzek 
and Niemeyer (2010) argued, theories of radical democracy cannot 
promote unregulated forms of disagreement but also have to 
structure their ideas around some standards of regulation that 
control what is allowed and considered appropriate in public 
communication. Without such standards, “anything would go,” 
and for example, any substantive position would be worthy of the 
respect of others. However, this makes radical democracy open to 
the same criticism leveled at deliberative democracy and its ideal of 
consensus: imposing restrictions on moral positions and citizens. 
For example, anyone who fails to express “the desire for a particu-
lar mode of human togetherness” argued for by Biesta (2011, p. 141) 
would have to be regarded as “undemocratic.” Thus, it is not only 
deliberative democracy and its ideal of consensus that excludes 
certain types of citizens, behavior, and positions from democratic 
participation. Therefore, it is possible to argue that the criticism 
coming from scholars favoring the radical pluralistic view is 
slightly misplaced. However, their criticism of deliberative 
democracy and consensus have been more broadly accepted in the 
educational field than in the field of political philosophy, in which 
the defense presented above is frequently recurrent (see, for 
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example, Erman, 2009; Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2010; Knops, 2007), 
and therefore, to present this defense in an educational context 
might be considered relevant.
Defending Consensus as an Aim of Democratic Education
Based on the short discussion above, the more important question 
to ask is not whether a certain conception of democracy is for or 
against consensus or dissensus, since both are inevitable elements 
of any conception of democracy, but rather how to formulate a 
notion of consensus that takes pluralism, dissensus, and disagree-
ment seriously. Dryzek and Niemeyer (2010) made one such 
attempt in their typology of consensus. In this typology, they 
distinguished three different types of consensus: normative, 
epistemic, and preference consensus. Normative consensus refers to 
agreement on the values driving the decision process. Epistemic 
consensus refers to agreement on how particular actions relate  
to different values in terms of cause and effect, while preference 
consensus refers to agreement on the actual decision of “what to 
do.” Let us look at an example of what these types may look like in a 
classroom discussion.
The following example is from a discussion that took place in 
Margaret’s fifth- grade classroom. The class was planning a party 
and discussed various aspects of it, such as the time and date, 
possible activities, and what to eat and drink. Using the question of 
what to eat and drink as a starting point, I will elaborate further to 
show what the three different types of consensus could have looked 
like had the discussion gone that far. A preference consensus would 
mean an agreement on what food to serve, for example, tacos. If the 
class had agreed that tacos was the preferable food to serve, 
preference consensus would have been reached. A normative 
consensus, on the other hand, would imply an agreement on the 
value level. For example, what is the most important feature of  
the food? Is it that it tastes good or that it is inexpensive? On the 
other hand, maybe the most important values pertaining to  
the food to be served at a party for thirty twelve- year- olds are 
instead that it is easy to prepare, serve, and eat. Agreement on these 
types of questions would indicate normative consensus. Located in 
between these two positions is epistemic consensus. This would 
imply agreement about causal relations, for example, between a 
desired value and a suggested alternative. If the argument had been 
made that the food should be easy to prepare, serve, and eat, would 
tacos satisfy that objective? Maybe pizza would be easier to eat and, 
therefore, if that value was preferred, would be a better alternative. 
But then again, maybe tacos would be easier to make in large 
quantities? An epistemic consensus would mean an agreement 
regarding this type of “factual” question. The position taken earlier 
in the article is that democratic deliberations ultimately are about 
reaching agreements on how to act. Thus, the goal would be to 
reach a preference consensus and agree on what food to serve. 
However, a preference consensus does not necessitate a normative 
or epistemic consensus. The students do not have to reach a 
consensus on all levels in order to make a decision on what food to 
serve. If they had reached a preference consensus and decided to 
serve pizza, they would still have been allowed to disagree about 
the values underlying that choice (normative disagreement) and/
or what values that choice would fulfill (epistemic disagreement). 
In fact, according to Sunstein (1995), that is usually how people 
make decisions based upon deliberations. They value arguments 
and facts differently but are nevertheless able to agree on a course 
of action (what he called incompletely theorized agreement).
To make this typology more complex, Dryzek and Niemeyer 
(2010) added a “meta” counterpart to each type of consensus. 
Consensus at the meta- level means recognition of the legitimacy of 
the different positions: that they are seen (by the participants) as 
reasonable, credible, and valid. A normative meta- consensus means 
an agreement regarding the different values present in the discus-
sion and that they are seen as reasonable basis from which to argue. 
Epistemic meta- consensus refers to agreement on the credibility of 
disputed beliefs and of their relevance to the issue at hand. For 
example, different participants can disagree on which alternative 
best corresponds with a certain value, but a meta- consensus of the 
epistemic kind means that they all agree on the credibility and 
relevance of the relations being discussed. Finally, preference 
meta- consensus relates to the different possible outcomes and is 
reached when there is an agreement on the number of choices and/
or the validity of the different ways that those choices can be 
structured.
Returning to the example of what food to serve at the fifth- 
grade class party, had the class agreed that, for example, the aspects 
of price, taste, and how easy it is to make, serve, and eat were all 
reasonable and important values to take into consideration, a 
normative meta- consensus would have been reached. Further-
more, had they settled and agreed that the most import value was 
the easiness in relation to preparation, serving, and eating (reached 
a normative consensus at the simple level) and then moved on to 
discuss different types of food that possibly could fulfill that value 
and agreed that both the alternatives of pizza and tacos could do 
that, meaning they are both relatively easy to prepare, serve, and 
eat, an epistemic meta- consensus would have been reached. 
Finally, a preference meta- consensus would have been reached had 
they all, for example, agreed that the (only) available alternatives to 
choose among were in fact pizza and tacos. Even though the 
typology becomes more complex with the inclusion of the meta- 
level, its main function remains rather uncomplicated: to help 
structure the ongoing disagreement and to keep the discussion 
productive in a deliberative sense. By reaching consensus at the 
meta- level, participants are able to keep the discussion productive 
in their search for a conclusion. In addition, focusing on consen-
sus at the meta- level means making fewer demands on participants 
and is thus an additional way to address seriously the challenging 
aspects of pluralism, dissensus, and disagreement.
How does Dryzek and Niemeyer’s (2010) typology help us 
defend consensus as an aim in democratic education? Ruitenberg 
(2010), for example, expressed the view that “a strive for (political) 
consensus means erasing the contestatory and conflictual nature of 
the common life.” Thus, to use consensus as an aim in democratic 
education is problematic because students could fail to learn how 
to have and to allow others to have different opinions, coexist with 
people with different values, and participate in ongoing processes 
of disagreement (also emphasized by Biesta, 2011). However, as 
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shown with the typology, consensus does not mean that continued 
disagreement is deemed impossible. A preference consensus does 
not necessitate a normative or epistemic consensus. Thus, many 
different forms of disagreements can exist after a preference 
consensus has been reached. Furthermore, adding the underlying 
view of consensus as a regulative idea, rather than an endpoint 
needed to be reached, it can also exist merely in the form of an aim 
to be striving for. This combination of consensus as a multifaceted 
concept and as a regulative aim shows that it is possible for 
consensus and dissensus to coexist and that neither consensus nor 
deliberative democracy is in conflict with pluralism or disagree-
ment. On the contrary, disagreement lies at the very foundation of 
deliberative democracy and is what fuels the need to have a 
discussion in the first place, because if there is no disagreement, 
there is no reason to have a discussion. Furthermore, striving 
toward consensus does not mean that the aspects of pluralism and 
continued dissensus are not taken seriously either. The emphasis 
on trying to solve moral conflicts with the use of discussions is 
rather an explicit attempt to try to handle pluralism seriously (see, 
for example, Gutmann & Thompson, 1996). By encouraging 
citizens and representatives to seek solutions across different belief 
systems and to use arguments other reasonable citizens can accept, 
deliberative democracy argues for an increased acknowledgment 
of different moral positions. Furthermore, a preference consensus 
reached and a decision made is always temporary and an issue 
discussed is always open to further investigation (Gutmann & 
Thompson, 2004). Continued disagreement is, therefore, always 
possible, even after a decision has been made. Consequently, I 
argue that deliberative democracy and its ideal of consensus are 
both suited as aims in democracy and democratic education and 
that neither constitutes a threat to pluralism and dissensus.
Defending Consensus as an Aim in Classroom Discussions
The more important question, though, in relation to the pedagogi-
cal assumptions embedded in this article, is the implications of the 
typology for the aim of consensus in classroom discussions. How 
will this typology answer the criticism raised by classroom 
practitioners, that consensus as a goal in classroom discussions 
creates several unwanted side effects, such as undesirable patterns 
of communication and emotional strain in students? Furthermore, 
is it possible to outline any pedagogical implications that will 
benefit the further discussion about education for deliberative 
democracy?
The answer to the first question is, on the surface, rather 
straightforward and has already been given: consensus is a 
multifaceted concept that, on its own, will not eliminate all 
possibilities for disagreement. However, if we use the typology and 
look at this criticism in greater detail, the answer is much more 
complex. First, the concern that consensus may cause emotional 
strain was raised by Susan and Evelyn based on the interpretation 
that striving for consensus implies having students give up their life 
values: “Students should not have to compromise and give up 
something they hold dear just because it is against what the 
majority believes,” and “They should not have to be burdened by 
the opinions they are carrying with them or risk having others 
laugh at them.” These teachers described a concern for having 
classroom discussions strive toward normative consensus at the 
simple level, or of trying to make all students agree on the values 
presented in the discussion. However, bearing the typology in 
mind, we can see that to strive for consensus does not have to mean 
to strive for agreement regarding values. Instead, for example, it 
could mean to strive for what has been termed preference 
consensus.
Using the same example as earlier to again illustrate this point, 
the fifth- grade class could have reached a preference consensus and 
agreed to serve pizza, without having reached a normative 
consensus. Some students could have favored this choice because 
they thought pizza tasted good while others may have favored it 
because they thought it would be the easiest food to serve. Thus, 
they could have agreed on what to do (preference consensus) 
without having agreed on the reasons for that choice (normative 
consensus) and consequently, a normative disagreement would 
still be possible. Thus, it is fully possible for a classroom discussion 
to strive toward consensus without having students give up their 
values, and thus, avoid causing emotional stress.
Granted, this example is less complex and controversial than 
the discussions the teachers are skeptical of conducting: These 
students are not expected to give up, or compromise, their values of 
life. However, it is perhaps precisely this insight the typology can 
provide. In a deliberative sense, democratic discussions are 
ultimately about making decisions about “what to do.” Thus, why 
someone prefers one alternative to another is, strictly speaking, 
irrelevant, while reaching an agreement about which alternative to 
choose is not. Therefore, in a deliberative educative sense, it might 
be more suitable to strive for a preference consensus because that 
would allow students to practice at the type of consensus delibera-
tive democracy is most interested in reaching. Hence, the typology 
shows that it is possible to strive for consensus in a classroom 
discussion without causing emotional strain, but it also allows us to 
outline a pedagogical implication: Perhaps the preferable consen-
sus to strive for, in a deliberative educative sense, is preference 
consensus.
The other main concern the teachers had with consensus was 
that it might negatively alter the pattern of communication in the 
discussion. Both Patrick and Margaret expressed this concern and 
argued that the (other) essential aspects of a good classroom 
discussion, such as reason- giving, reflection, listening, coopera-
tion, and so on, would be difficult to achieve if consensus was set as 
an aim: “If you want a safe classroom climate where students really 
listen to each other, then aiming at consensus can be a tricky thing,” 
and “Consensus makes students alter their approach and instead of 
listening and responding to each other they end up trying to win 
the discussion.” At the core of this criticism is a similar interpreta-
tion of consensus as that found in theories of radical pluralism, 
proclaiming that consensus leaves little or no room for any kind of 
disagreement. This interpretation is imbedded in both Patrick and 
Margaret’s quotes and can be rephrased: Consensus makes 
students focus on finding the right answer as given by the teacher, 
and consensus makes students become preoccupied with trying to 
get everyone to agree with their point of view. Hence, to answer 
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this criticism is, once again, to answer the question of whether it is 
possible to strive for consensus while at the same time preserving 
the aspect of disagreement. At the same time, though, the chal-
lenges voiced by Patrick and Margaret are challenges deserving of 
serious and lengthy discussions, to which the answer given above, 
about having classroom discussions aim at a preference consensus, 
is unsatisfactory.
To address Patrick’s and Margaret’s concern, we can turn to 
the meta- level of the typology. The main function of the meta- level 
is to help structure the ongoing process of deliberation and to keep 
the discussion productive in a deliberative sense. Thus, if the 
deliberative discussion is failing, it is always possible to take a step 
back and instead of focusing on the decision, try to understand 
(and possibly agree on) the different values and positions used in 
the discussion and their relevance to the problem at hand  
(Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2010). One can apply this principle in a 
classroom situation as well. If a classroom discussion has turned 
into a competition and the students are preoccupied with trying to 
win it, it is always possible to take a step back. By taking a step back 
and instead having them elaborate on the values and positions 
being discussed (a normative meta- discussion), or having them 
discuss the relevance of those positions to the issue at hand (an 
epistemic meta- discussion), or trying to get them to agree on the 
relevant alternatives (reaching a preference meta- consensus), it 
might be possible to get them to start listening to each other’s 
arguments again. Thus, by delaying the decision- making process 
and instead focus on the meta- level, the concerns raised by  
Patrick and Margaret could be avoided.
However, we can also use the meta- level to redefine this 
problematic situation as a possible deliberative learning situation. 
Aiming at meta- consensus makes participants focus on under-
standing and acknowledging different viewpoints, and encourages 
them to seek agreements across their differences. Thus, turning to 
the meta- level when a classroom discussion has turned into a 
competitive and conflictual discussion can provide students with a 
learning opportunity of how to turn a dysfunctional discussion 
into a productive democratic deliberation. Furthermore, once they 
have (re)established the deliberative pattern of communication, 
they can (again) gradually begin to move in the direction of a 
preference consensus or a meta- preference consensus. However, it 
is important to remember that not all disagreements are solved 
with deliberations. Sometimes a vote or a compromise is needed. 
Yet in a deliberative educative sense, one should not turn to these 
methods of decision- making too early. That would deprive the 
students the opportunity to practice turning the conflictual 
discussion into a deliberative discussion, and of how to use 
arguments presented in a discussion to accept an outcome 
determined by a vote or compromise. Thus, the meta- level of the 
typology allows us to defend consensus against the concern that  
it might cause undesirable patterns of communication. However, it 
also allows us to identify a potential deliberative learning situation, 
one where students are presented with an opportunity to practice 
turning a dysfunctional discussion into a productive democratic 
deliberation.
To conclude the defense of consensus against the second type 
of criticism in democratic education, the one claiming that it is 
unfit as a goal for classroom discussions, we can again turn to 
Dryzek and Niemeyer’s (2010) complex and nuanced formulation 
of consensus and argue that it is (fully) possible to strive for 
consensus in a classroom discussion without subjecting students to 
emotional stress and without having to give up the essential 
elements of reason- giving and reflection. Furthermore, we can also 
use the typology of consensus to outline two possible pedagogical 
implications— that preference consensus is perhaps the most 
important type of consensus to learn how to strive for in a delibera-
tive sense and that a conflictual classroom discussion can be seen 
as a potential (deliberative) learning situation.
Conclusion
The aim of consensus is essential to deliberative democracy. 
However, this aim has also been one of the most frequently 
criticized aspects within the field of political philosophy. 
Furthermore, as the idea of deliberative democracy has been 
transferred to an educational context, the aim of consensus has 
again been a target of criticism. In this article, two types of educa-
tional criticism against consensus have been presented: one 
criticizing it as an aim for democratic education on the grounds 
that it fails to account for the conflictual nature of democracy and 
thereby disallows disagreement and pluralism, and the other 
criticizing it as an aim in classroom discussions based on the idea 
that it affects classroom discussions in negative ways. I have refuted 
both objections.
The defense of consensus presented in this article is structured 
around the idea that consensus is a regulative idea and a multifac-
eted concept that allows for different types of agreements and 
disagreements to coexist in harmony with one other. Based on this 
idea, I argue that it is fully possible to strive for consensus in 
democratic education without dismissing all possibilities for 
disagreement, dissensus, or pluralism. Furthermore, it is also fully 
possible to strive for consensus in classroom discussions without 
risk causing emotional stress, without losing the essential discur-
sive tools of reason- giving, listening, and reflection, and without 
demanding that students give up their values. However, I do not 
argue that every classroom discussion must strive for consensus. 
There are, of course, other types of discussions valuable in a 
democratic educative sense, but my conclusion is still that consen-
sus should be regarded neither as a problematic aim in democratic 
education nor in (democratic) classroom discussions, even to 
those valuing disagreement and pluralism.
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